China’s pro-Moscow ‘peace talks’ push 

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China Watcher

By PHELIM KINE

with STUART LAU

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Hi, China Watchers. Today we look at Beijing's pro-Russian diplomacy push at the United Nations General Assembly in New York, examine the future of U.S.-China tech decoupling and unpack how a child's murder has roiled Japan-China relations. And we profile a book that argues that successful U.S.-China decoupling may create "a healthier relationship, where pragmatism prevails."

Let's get to it. — Phelim.

"Preventing Russia from losing" — Beijing's Ukraine peace talks plan

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President Xi Jinping addresses the United Nations General Assembly on September 21, 2021. | Mary Altaffer – Pool/Getty Images

What's China up to at the U.N. this week? Talking up Chinese leader Xi Jinping's stamp of approval for the U.N.'s new Global Digital Compact designed to "connect all persons to the Internet" took up a chunk of Monday. A victory walk in response to what Beijing called a ringing defense of its human rights record by dozens of countries at the United Nations General Assembly was also high on the agenda.

But China's big push in New York appears to be trying to line up the likes of India, Brazil and other countries to support Beijing's plan for Russia-Ukraine peace talks that will favor Moscow's interests over Kyiv's.

That's according to a document obtained by POLITICO, and reported on Wednesday by your host along with POLITICO's Nahal Toosi and Suzanne Lynch.

China's pursuit of India's support could create particular trouble for Ukraine. Kyiv has been hoping that New Delhi may help broker a peace pact it can live with. That's because despite New Delhi's failure to condemn Russia's war on Ukraine, India has advocated an end to the conflict and respect for Kyiv's territorial integrity and sovereignty. India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi has gone so far as to declare himself "a friend" of Ukraine and to push for a peace agreement.

New Delhi is actively speaking to both Moscow and Kyiv in a bid to jumpstart peace talks, India's External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar told an Asia Society Policy Institute event in New York on Tuesday.

The Indian embassy in Washington declined to comment on the alleged push by China at the U.N.

If China is able to get a large group of countries to support its proposal, it could allow Beijing to tout it as evidence that the "world majority" favors Beijing's terms for Russia-Ukraine peace talks, according to the document. A formal unveiling of the peace talks plan will follow next month at a meeting of the BRICS grouping of emerging economies — centered around Brazil, India, Russia and China — in Kazan, Russia, next month, the document said.

U.S.-China decoupling meets the presidential election

The Biden administration has pursued a decoupling (or "de-risking") from China — a dual strategy aimed to both reduce U.S. reliance on Chinese supply chains and block Beijing's access to key high technology items including semiconductors that could benefit the country's military industrial complex.

How might that approach change under a new administration in 2025? China Watcher spoke to Jon Bateman, co-director of the Technology and International Affairs Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and author of an influential report on U.S.-China decoupling for what may lie ahead. You can listen to my full conversation with Bateman on the POLITICO Tech podcast here.

Responses have been edited for length and clarity.

How might decoupling differ under a Harris presidency versus a Trump presidency?

We know very little about her views. But it’s very likely that she’ll continue the Biden trajectory … a gradual, deliberate tightening of many forms of restrictions on Chinese technology. And continue to nurture U.S. industrial policy and actually get Congress to appropriate money to continue the Inflation Reduction Act and the Chips and Science Act.

Trump is much harder to predict. His personal views matter a lot more because he dominates his party. He also changes his mind a lot, and he might do things that further stretch the limits of executive power. So Congress might be less of a constraint on him. There’s a far-out universe in which he does some kind of grand bargain with Xi Jinping. But every public signal that he’s sending is that he will double down on the shock that he delivered to the U.S.-China technology relationship in his first term.

How would Trump's proposals for across-the-board tariffs on Chinese products affect decoupling?

It could be a radical accelerant. Americans would stop importing as many Chinese finished tech products, things that we otherwise have not been thinking about as big parts of this decoupling push like consumer electronics. At the same time, American manufacturers would be buying fewer raw materials and intermediate goods from China. That will further the decoupling of manufacturing and tech as well.

What’s the first step that either a President Harris or President Trump should take in executing or extending a successful decoupling strategy?

We need to pivot to monitoring whether [decoupling efforts] might be counterproductive and only catalyzing China to stimulate its own [industrial] ecosystem. And strategizing and articulating what we’re trying to achieve. We rarely stop to reflect on what is a good end state — the kind of relationship we want to have with China.

It’s all well and good when a U.S. government official says it’s just a "small yard, it’s just a high fence around this small area," What you will virtually never hear any U.S. leader say is what is safe.

TRANSLATING WASHINGTON

— REP. CHU: TRUMP'S ASIAN 'SCAPEGOATING' PERSISTS: Donald Trump's rhetoric while in office continues to haunt Asian Americans and Pacific islander peoples, said Rep. Judy Chu (D-Calif), chair of the Congressional Asian Pacific American Caucus. "Racist terms Trump used like 'kung flu' and 'China virus' scapegoated our communities and we continue to be scapegoated for public health crises, economic fear and national security concerns," Chu told reporters Wednesday. She spoke at the launch of a report by the nonprofit advocacy group Stop AAPI Hate based on a survey of hate crimes in 2023. Trump's campaign punched back. "There has been no bigger advocate for the AAPI community than President Trump … anyone who says otherwise is disgustingly using the AAPI community to play political games for their own benefit," said campaign spokesperson Steven Cheung.

— LAWMAKER LASHES CRITIQUE OF CHINA BILL: Yet another bill targeting China's perceived national security threat has hit an executive branch speed bump. The White House's Office of Management and Budget said Monday that it "opposed" the Stop CCP Act which would impose visa and financial sanctions on the 205 members of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee senior leadership "for human rights violations, including genocide." Doing so would likely "cut off any channels of communication between our two governments … destabilizing U.S.-PRC relations and undermining U.S. national interests," the office said.

On Tuesday, the bill's lead sponsor, Rep. Lisa McLain (R-Mich.) dismissed that critique. Biden's "weakness on the world stage has emboldened China … we shouldn't be surprised at the administration's opposition since they continue to cozy up to China," McLain said.

— HOUSE GOP REVIVE OUTBOUND INVESTMENT BILL: House Republicans say they are close to a deal on legislation that would restrict U.S. investments in China, a sign that talks on the matter have quickly picked up following months of delay. House Foreign Affairs Chair Michael McCaul said Tuesday that a GOP working group seeking to reconcile an intra-party split on the issue is near an agreement following a meeting earlier in the day. He has been at odds with House Financial Services Chair Patrick McHenry (R-N.C.) and McHenry’s top deputies on the policy. "I think it's going in a good direction," McCaul said in an interview. POLITICO's Jasper Goodman has the full story here (for U.S. Pros!).

TRANSLATING EUROPE

DENMARK CALLS ON EUROPE TO HOLD CHINA ACCOUNTABLE FOR AID TO RUSSIA: Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen blasted China for supporting Russia in its war against Ukraine and accused Beijing of not playing by international trade rules in an interview with POLITICO Global Playbook author Suzanne Lynch. Speaking on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly in New York, Frederiksen name-checked China as part of a group of four countries including Russia, North Korea and Iran, whose close cooperation "has huge global consequences."

"I don't think it would be possible for Russia to have a full-scale war for more than two-and-a-half years now without help from China," she said. "We cannot continue a situation where China helps Russia in a war … in Europe, without consequences. They have to be held responsible for their activities."

She added that the consequences for Beijing must be political. "You cannot on the one hand let Russia attack another European country and continue like nothing has happened," she said, hot on the heels of Reuter's scoop, citing intel sources, that Russia has been running a secret war drones project in China.

Move on from the old time: "We have tried with all actors on the global season to have good cooperation — we tried it with Russia, buying their gas and their oil," Frederiksen said. "I think we have tried to do the same with China — to have normal cooperation between partners on different aspects and topics. We cannot allow ourselves to be naïve … You cannot go back to the situation before the war in Ukraine and the same goes for China now."

CHINA, EU MULL EV PRICE FLOOR: Brussels and Beijing are engaged in intense 11th-hour negotiations on Chinese electric vehicle subsidies, raising hopes in Germany that EU duties — and a wider trade war — can still be avoided, officials familiar with the talks told POLITICO's Hans von der Burchard. Under discussion is the idea of setting voluntary minimum prices that would offset the market-distorting Chinese subsidies, thereby rendering the planned EU duties moot. One official described the concept as a "surcharge" that would balance out the Chinese state aid. Two people briefed on the negotiations told Berlin Playbook that Chinese representatives had stayed back in Brussels after the high-level trade talks last week, to continue negotiations for a deal which would avoid EU tariffs.

EU SIGNALS ATTENTION ON CHINESE CARS' SECURITY RISKS: EU digital chief Margrethe Vestager told POLITICO's Doug Palmer on Tuesday that the European Commission's services are studying the U.S. Commerce Department's proposal to ban Chinese and Russian connected cars. "[We] are looking at this, also with our economic security experts … [a connected vehicle] is basically computers and wheels. It can register everything where it is, and it can also transmit that data to those who have access to the data," Vestager said. "It's legitimate to look into whether or not that kind of technology can be misused when it comes to security issues."

Commission spokesperson Thomas Regnier said Brussels will "closely monitor" the U.S. proposal and any related "direct or indirect impact." The bloc will also "intensify exchanges" with the U.S. through the EU-U.S. Trade and Technology Council, the bi-annual gathering of top transatlantic trade and tech officials, Pieter Haeck and Jordyn Dahl write in to report.

HOT FROM THE CHINA WATCHERSPHERE

— MURDER CASE ROILS JAPAN-CHINA TIES: Chinese authorities are pushing back at Japanese government anger about the murder of a Japanese schoolboy in the southern city of Shenzhen last week. The timing of the crime — on the anniversary of the 1931 Mukden incident which marked the start of Japan's invasion of China's Manchuria region — has sparked speculation that it was a response to widespread anti-Japanese rhetoric on China's tightly controlled internet.

"Malicious and anti-Japanese social media and internet posts, including those related to Japanese schools are directly linked to the safety of children," Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa told her Chinese counterpart Wang Yi in a meeting at the United Nations in New York on Monday.

Beijing is dismissing those concerns. "It's an individual case … China does not teach its people to hate Japan," Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian responded Tuesday.

— TAIWAN ADVANCES TALKS ON ARMS CO-PRODUCTION: Government officials from the U.S. and Taiwan sat down this week for three days of discussions with U.S. armament firms in Philadelphia on issues including allowing Taiwan-based manufacturers to produce advanced U.S. weapons systems. That's a fix that U.S. lawmakers are pushing to address the backlog in U.S. arms deliveries to Taiwan.

Attendees of the U.S.-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference, which ended Tuesday, made progress, but a "bureaucratic change of mindset" is needed for formal approval of such a plan, said U.S.-Taiwan Business Council president Rupert Hammond-Chambers. "Once that decision is made then there can be practical discussions about how we're going to go about that, how to license [weapons] from the company in question and who is going to make them," Hammond-Chambers said.

— BEIJING'S ECONOMIC STIMULUS EVOKES SKEPTICISM: The Chinese government rolled out a series of measures on Tuesday to boost its sagging economy. They include cutting mortgage interest rates to try to inflate the country's anemic property sector and reducing funds that lenders set aside for their reserve ratios. It's all a bid to steer up to $142 billion into the economy, Chinese state media reported. But those moves address the symptoms of the malaise rather than root causes.

"China's economy is in a systemic pickle…[so] these measures will come as relief but not as a solution," said George Magnus, an associate at Oxford University's China Centre and an expert on the country's economic challenges. Beijing needs to implement policies to encourage "genuine shifts in consumer demand, income policies and tax reform," to address key economic weaknesses, Magnus added.

— CANADA MULLS BAN ON SMART CAR TECH: The Canadian government is considering imposing its own version of the Biden administration's ban on imports of certain Chinese smart cars, key software and parts due to national security concerns. "We take very seriously the security threat from China," Canada's Deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland told reporters Tuesday in response to a question about whether Canada will do likewise, POLITICO's Sue Allan writes in from Ottawa. Freeland's comments reflect growing Canadian concern about the potential dangers of Chinese tech. "Chinese EVs are potential spy machines on wheels," Charles Burton, a former diplomat at Canada’s embassy in Beijing and a senior fellow at the think tank Sinopsis, told a Canadian parliamentary hearing last week.

THREE MINUTES WITH …

Japan's Prime Minister Fumio Kishida steps down this week after three years in office. The top Liberal Democratic Party candidates jockeying to replace him include former environment minister Shinjiro Koizumi (son of former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi), economic security minister Sanae Takaichi and former defense chief Shigeru Ishiba.

Yuki Tatsumi – former special assistant for political affairs at the Japanese embassy in Washington and currently director of the Japan Program at the Stimson Center — unpacked the prospects for U.S.-Japan ties in the post-Kishida era.

Responses have been edited for length and clarity.

Kishida's leaving. What's next?

It is very hard for me to see Mr. Koizumi depart significantly from [Kishida's policies]. Same thing with Mr. Ishiba, or Ms. Takaichi. None of them really have a significantly different policy outlook. Mr. Koizumi and Miss Takaichi because of their more conservative leanings could become a little bit harder on China. Mr. Ishiba, having been in a cabinet for a long time prior, has a little bit more nuanced position, but the bottom line is, he’s very pro [developing] Japan’s own defense capability as well.

What will determine the winner?

First and foremost — who could win the election [in July 2025].

Second of all — who would fare best facing an incoming new U.S. president, whether Trump or Harris. You could argue that if we may see the first female American president, then someone like Ishiba, who is kind of status quo from the old generation, probably wouldn’t do so well. If anything [LDP voters] will be more motivated toward Takaichi or Koizumi for generational change.

How will Japan view a possible second Trump presidency?

There's probably greater trepidation about a second Trump administration, because we’re not sure if anybody other than [the late Prime Minister Shinzo] Abe can strike that personal rapport with Mr. Trump. And they know from that experience how their leader gets along with him is critically important to minimize a bruising relationship.

HEADLINES

CBC: ‘From hell to limbo’: Michael Kovrig describes more than a thousand days as China’s prisoner

The Telegraph: The British travel bloggers 'sugarcoating' China's Uyghur problem to the delight of Beijing

Wall Street Journal: Top economist in China vanishes after private WeChat comments

New Bloom: Taking Hong Kong seeds to the world

ONE BOOK, THREE QUESTIONS

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Bristol University Press

The Book: A New Cold War: U.S.-China Relations in the 21st Century

The Author: Zeno Leoni is an assistant professor in the Defence Studies Department of King’s College London

Responses have been edited for length and clarity.

What is the most important takeaway from your book?

The U.S. and China appear to be locked into a relationship of forced coexistence, which has resulted in a new type of Cold War in which competition and restraint coexist on multiple levels. It pits the world's two largest armed forces against each other, although this has fallen short of direct confrontation. And the U.S.-China relationship benefits from important dynamics — such as economic interdependence — that encourage restraint as opposed to fighting.

What was the most surprising thing you learned while writing this book?

That the U.S.-China relationship should be considered in the long term — it has experienced a long series of highs and lows over the decades — rather than looking at the latest crises in isolation from the past. And that the relationship is multifaceted — government, business, scientific community — which all differ in terms of levels of cooperation, suspicion and hostility.

How likely is it that the two countries can eventually revert to warmer bilateral ties?


Tensions between Washington and Beijing caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, and competition over the resources for a transition to a green economy leave me struggling to see what could lead to warmer ties.

That doesn't mean there will be a direct confrontation soon. Decoupling between the two countries and a new iron curtain on some strategic sectors of the economy – not all – could potentially lead to a healthier relationship, where pragmatism prevails over frustrated expectations.

Got a book to recommend? Tell me about it at pkine@politico.com.

Thanks to: Heidi Vogt, Nahal Toosi, Suzanne Lynch, Nick Taylor-Vaisey, Sue Allan, Pieter Haeck, Jordyn Dahl and digital producers Emma Cordover and Giulia Poloni. Do you have tips? Chinese-language stories we might have missed? Would you like to contribute to China Watcher or comment on this week’s items? Email us at pkine@politico.com slau@politico.com

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