All roads lead to Rome, but not Belt and Road?

Decoding transatlantic relations with Beijing.

POLITICO China Direct

By STUART LAU

with PHELIM KINE

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HELLO, SEPTEMBER. The holiday’s over and let’s get back to business. China Watcher is also revving up to full speed again for this first rentrée edition, with Stuart Lau reporting in Brussels and Phelim Kine in D.C. As always, email us with all your tips, comments and event invites.

ITALY PLOTS WAY OUT

COUNTDOWN PARTY IN BEIJING: It’s the worst-kept secret in Rome that Giorgia Meloni‘s government is racing against time to plot a diplomatic exit from China’s Belt and Road Initiative, a decision that has to be finalized by the end of the year. That was high on the agenda when Italy’s Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani met his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi on Monday. This comes as legislators in Rome speculate that the right-wing coalition government is trying to avoid making the final decision by itself — and will instead turn to the parliament for a vote so it could share the blame with the other parties in case Beijing over-reacts.

Beijing’s last-ditch lobbying: Wang, for his part, made a last-ditch effort to persuade Italy. “[China and Italy] should inherit the Silk Road spirit and persist in acting as the bridge for East-West civilizational dialogue,” he told Tajani. “The results for Belt and Road cooperation have been fruitful. Over the past five years, China-Italy trade volume increased from $50 billion to $80 billion, while Italy’s exports to China rose by about 30 percent.” Other than that, however, the public records don’t say much about the latest state-of-play of the deal’s negotiations.

But this meeting provides some hints: In a relatively rare arrangement for a visiting foreign minister, Tajani met with China’s Commerce Minister Wang Wentao, who’s increasingly stepped into tricky global trade issues, including a meeting with his U.S. counterpart Gina Raimondo last week. According to Beijing’s readout, Wang told the Italian politician that China “welcomes Italian enterprises’ expansion of trade and investment in China.”

Earlier reports suggest that Italy is looking into “alternative” trade agreements with Beijing in order to engage in some face saving while leaving the Belt and Road.

Remind me: Italy entered into a memorandum of understanding with China on joining the Belt and Road in 2019, during President Xi Jinping‘s visit to Rome. If no action is taken by the end of this year, the memorandum will be automatically renewed in March.

BEIJING SOFTENS STANCE? The state-run Global Times newspaper, citing government-linked academics, said in an analysis that Italy’s dropout “should not be fundamentally detrimental.”

OPENING SHOT: Prior to his departure, Tajani was dropping all possible hints that the days of Rome’s membership are numbered. “The Italian Parliament is checking the situation. In this moment the countries without the Belt and Road Initiative — the European countries — are working better than us. For this, Italy will decide if [we] stay or not stay in the Belt and Road Initiative. In the parliament, many parties are against it," he told CNBC.

And that surprises lawmakers and observers: The Meloni government hasn’t been the most, well, interested in involving the parliament for major foreign policy decisions. So why now?

A vote is on the way, perhaps? Tajani’s remarks suggest the government could put the debate to a vote in the parliament, thereby lessening the diplomatic pressure from Beijing on Rome. According to Italian lawmaker Lia Quartapelle, of the opposition Democratic Party, there could be such a vote on the matter although it’s not yet clear at this stage.

“We haven’t seen such an eagerness to share with parliament other decisions — and I think about for example Libya policy or Africa policy, which to Italy are equally important,” Quartapelle told China Watcher. “We welcome this attitude by the government, but we wouldn’t like this attitude to be a way to shy away from their responsibility to outline a comprehensive China strategy; on the other hand, I fear that this might be a way to share, with the opposition, the burden of a difficult political decision.”

Next step: Meloni plans to visit China to meet Xi personally later this year, a trip that she’s been planning for months.

END OF AN ERA

GUNNAR WIEGAND, the European Union’s top Asia policymaker, retired last week. Just before his departure, he sat down with China Watcher in his Brussels office to look at his last seven years as Asia managing director of the European External Action Service — and the path ahead for EU-China relations. The interview has been edited for clarity.

What do China-Russia relations mean for Europe?

The wake-up call in explicit terms was the February 4, 2022 Joint Declaration, just before the war in Ukraine started, where basically China subscribes to the Russian interpretation of what happens in Europe in terms of so-called legitimate security interests and security architecture questions. And Russia subscribes to the Chinese vision of what happens in the Asia-Pacific space. This was much more formally confirmed again, in the March visit this year of President Xi Jinping to Moscow, which was his first visit abroad in his third term. It does represent a common ambition to change the global order, based on new principles. It is something we have to clearly take into account: We cannot see partners only in the way we would like them to develop; we have to see partners in the way they do develop.

How should the EU react to China’s increasing aggression on Taiwan?

The positioning of the EU as regards Taiwan has been clearly expressed in the European Council conclusions [in June], and it was made clear for the first time that not only do we oppose any unilateral change of the status quo, but we in particular oppose any use of force — or of economic coercion.

The rhetoric sometimes goes very far, the demonstrations of force go very far, and we see it as a key task of the EU to make clear to everyone that maintaining the status quo has been highly successful over decades for the economic and social development of both Taiwan and mainland China.

We do not exclude that a peaceful process based on mutual agreement would lead to the “One China” in terms of reunification, but it must be peaceful and based on mutual agreement. I think that it is often too easy that on the basis of what are perceived provocations, shows of force follow. Of course, the [Taiwanese] presidential elections next year are very closely watched in Beijing. We have made all the time clear — all the EU institutions, all member states — that we pursue the EU’s One China policy.

Is China’s wolf warrior diplomacy a hurdle?

We’ve had the privilege over the last many years in Brussels to have no wolf warriors, but Chinese ambassadors who were always interested in achieving concrete results. You can’t say the same for Paris, and I don’t think that anyone would say that the Chinese-French relations in terms of what the public perceives have been improved by many of the public interventions of the ambassador. Suddenly they have come to the conclusion that a successful diplomat is a diplomat who is also seen in the media — and not only in the traditional media, but also in new media. But I think they have realized that the limits for the wolf warrior diplomacy are where it becomes counterproductive.

While the EU says Indo-Pacific countries don’t want to make a choice, China’s neighboring countries from Vietnam to Mongolia are keeping closer ties with the West, not to mention Japan or South Korea. What does that tell you?

It tells us that they all want to hedge against risks. I just had the Mongolian deputy prime minister here [in late July]. The Polish president, French president and German foreign minister were there. As part of the “third neighbor” policy, Mongolia is significantly trying to improve ties with Europe. Can we take Mongolia out of its geography? No, we cannot; Russia and China are the only two neighbors they have. But they are important partners for us in many ways.

If you look at the Japanese or Korean interaction with China, they couldn’t be more like-minded than we are. At the same time, it is not a secret that Japan and Korea have very strong economic relations with China and cooperate with China in many policy fields.

The comparison you make with Mongolia or Vietnam or Japan or Korea, when you look exactly at this, they are not so different from our position. Yes, you have to be aware of all political and security risks, you have to be aware that we are very different systems — which by the way is not the case between Vietnam and China — but we remain engaged. We have interests to pursue from both sides, and there will be no decoupling.

FOR MORE: Here’s my write-up of the other key points from the interview.

TRANSLATING WASHINGTON

BIDEN'S BLUNDER NOT ATTENDING ASEAN MEETING: This should be a big week for U.S. ties with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, but President Joe Biden is sitting this one out. 

Biden is dispatching Vice President Kamala Harris to sub for him at the U.S.-ASEAN Summit and the East Asia Summit in Jakarta from August 4-7. Biden is prioritizing an appearance the August 7-10 G20 meeting in New Delhi and a visit to Vietnam on September 10 over pressing the flesh with ASEAN leaders whose goodwill is key to his administration's China-countering Indo-Pacific Strategy.

A chorus of former U.S. officials with deep experience in the region say he's making a mistake. Sending Harris to Jakarta "doesn't meet [ASEAN] expectations — and it sends a negative signal," said Piper Campbell, former head of the U.S. Mission to ASEAN based in Jakarta. "The Biden administration is still putting meat on the bones of their Indo-Pacific Strategy and Biden not attending means he doesn't get the important picture from the region of how that should look," Campbell said.

Biden's decision to skip the ASEAN summit raises questions about his pledge of "a new era in U.S.-ASEAN relations" at a meeting in D.C. in 2021. That produced a new U.S.-ASEAN Comprehensive Strategic Partnership geared to new cooperation in areas including electrical vehicle development, infrastructure investment and food security. Biden followed that up by attending both the U.S.-ASEAN meeting and the East Asia Summit in November in Phnom Penh. That outreach aimed to persuade regional leaders who benefit from lucrative trade with China and are dubious of America's long-term commitment to Asia that the U.S. is back for the long term. 

But memories persist of how conflicts in the Middle East quickly derailed President Barack Obama's promised "pivot to Asia" in 2011. And Biden's decision to skip the ASEAN meeting in Jakarta this week suggests that his regional charm offensive may have run out of steam. "Folks in Southeast Asia see attending these meetings as the litmus test of engagement," said Zack Cooper, former assistant to the deputy national security adviser for combating terrorism at the National Security Council and senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Biden's absence in Jakarta "will do real damage — it's going to make it more difficult for the United States to make its case that it’s an engaged present partner in the region," Cooper said.

The administration rejects suggestions that Biden's non-ASEAN travel plans suggest he's discounting the importance of U.S. ties with the region. "Look at the totality of what the United States has done in the [ASEAN] region in the course of the past two and a half years, and it is an unbelievable track record, not just of showing up in meetings …but actually in the results that we have generated," National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan told reporters last month when asked about Biden's non-attendance at the ASEAN summit.

BIDEN 'DISAPPOINTED' XI'S SKIPPING G20 MEETING: President Biden is "disappointed" that Chinese paramount leader Xi Jinping won't attend the September 7-10 G20 leaders’ meeting in New Delhi. Chinese Premier Li Qiang will lead the Chinese delegation in New Delhi, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said on Monday. But Biden teased an upcoming one-on-one meeting with Xi, without elaborating. "I'm going to get to see him," Biden told reporters on Sunday. Biden's climate envoy John Kerry suggested in July that the two leaders will meet on the sidelines of the APEC summit in San Francisco in November. 

OTHER HEADLINES THIS WEEK

AP: China's new national map sets off a wave of protests

Diplomat: Is North Macedonia poised to reboot Its 'Taiwan Adventure?'

Financial Times: Billionaire founder of Foxconn Terry Gou leaves board to pursue Taiwan presidential bid

Guardian: China continues coal spree despite climate goals

New York Times Paul Krugman: Why is China in so much trouble?

MANY THANKS: To editor Christian Oliver and producer Giovanna Coi.

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